Chapter 1: Becoming and Being, Process and Enaction

Chapter 1: Becoming and Being, Process and Enaction

Living activity itself is a pattern that exists embedded in an energetic flow, one that begins and ends outside of the organism. (Godfrey-Smith, 2020, p. 34).

The conglomerate is best interpreted as a persistent pattern imposed on a flow[....] Conglomerates, as patterns imposed on flows, can be modified to augment properties such as self-repair and homeostasis, thereby further increasing their persistence. Disturbing such conglomerates is much like disturbing the standing wave that builds up before a rock in a whitewater river—as soon as the disturbance is removed, the standing wave reforms. (Holland, 2012, p. 107)

The living present does not flow through time; time “wells up” within it. Husserl describes the living present as “standing-streaming.” It is standing because it does not move in or through time; it is streaming because as the continuous operation of primal impression-retention-protention, it underlies any appearance of flow whatsoever, including the appearance of consciousness to itself as flow. (Thompson, 2007, p. 297).

In a word, the organic form stands in a dialectical relation of needful freedom to matter. (Hans Jonas) 

We are but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water. We are not stuff that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves. (Weiner)

Enlightenment is when the wave realizes that it is the ocean. (Thich Nhat Hanh)

Ontogeny Precedes Ontology 

This project discusses the philosophies of process ontology and enaction.

Ontic (ont-ic) derives from the Greek root “ont,” for “being.” Ontology is a branch of metaphysics regarding the study of being, i.e. the being of a being. Ontics regard the characteristics of beings. Ontology refers to the metaphysical question of “what is the meaning of being?” Ontics refers to the question of “what beings are there, and what are they like?” (Munday, 2009).

In biology, the specific usage of the word “ontogeny” refers to developmental processes of an organism, e.g. embryology and morphogenesis (Kaas, 2009). A more general usage of “onto-geny” can be deconstructed and repurposed to encompass the processual becoming (-gen) of beings (ont-) across multidisciplinary studies, beyond developmental biology. Compared to the specific category of biological ontogeny, a general ontogeny refers to a broader scope of ontically precedent processes of becoming. The usage of general onto-geny is employed here to provide a multidisciplinary term to categorize broad developmental processes including, but not limited to, the domain of biological processes of becoming.

General onto-geny regards the processes of becoming for ontical beings, i.e. how ordered patterns of existing come-to-be. The study of ontogeny (ontogen-ology) describes a typology of ontically precedent developmental processes beyond the specific category of biological development. Regarding general onto-geny, onto-genology is a study of onto-genetics. For example, the expanded category of general ontogeny may include processes from complexity science, evolution, development, niche construction, eco-evo-devo science, autopoiesis and enactive philosophy. The neologism of ontogenology refers to the study of (-ology) various ontically precedent processes of becoming. Restated, ontogenology classifies a typology for processes of general onto-geny. In short, ontogenology is the study of becomings. 

The project of ontogenology develops process metaphysics by classifying and relating abstracted patterns of ontically precedent processes of becoming. The utility of the terms general ontogeny and ontogenology is to enable broader discussion, analogy, relation and classification regarding general patterns of developmental processes crossing multidisciplinary fields of study. Ontogenology relates to what Bapteste and Anderson call a typology of processes (2018):

We wish to [...] identify some regularities at an even higher level of abstraction: the networks of processes, using a process typology. If successful, the most important payoff from such a strategy would be the detection of universal trends in processual networks and the possibility of identifying a simple ‘alphabet’ of processes. A richer and more explicit set of analytical patterns, approximating intersecting processes, could help evolutionary biologists make better sense of the stunning diversity of evolutionary phenomena, such as early transitions in the evolution of life, the genetic sharing involved in microbial social life, or new joint physiologies, organs, and modes of reproduction involved in evolutionary transitions and in adaptations. At a more general level, the development of a typology of processes would constitute a genuine attempt toward unification within the (logically pluralistic) biological sciences. 

The aim of ontogenology is to explicate a typology of processes, specifically a study of ontically precedent generative processes. A typology of generative processes of 

becoming precedes the abstraction of stabilized patterns of being. In a circular and non-dichotomous way, becoming precedes being. Additionally, ontogeny precedes ontology, in that becoming precedes the study of being. If being is best understood through processes of becoming, and if the study of being is best described through the studies of processes of becoming, then ontology is classified by ontogen-ology. 

Justifying the Usage of Ontogenology as a Neologism 

Theodosius Dobzhansky wrote “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,” but more broadly, nothing concerning existential being makes sense except in the light of processes-of-becoming. The neologism of ontogenology is an umbrella term encompassing fields such as complexity science, self organization, evolution, development, niche construction, autopoiesis, enaction, sociocultural evolution and their relata. Far from being the Grand Unified Theory of biology, natural selection is one process-of-becoming interacting amongst many. 

Ontogenology is defined as the study of ontically precedent generative processes. As a neologism, ontogenology needs justification. Another six-syllable philosophical term needs to be particularly useful to warrant its place alongside phenomenology. 

This term is derived from the Greek root ont- (being), gen- (produce, as in generate), and ology (study of). The motivation to explicate ontogenology as “a general study of the processes of becoming” is to explain how beings may come-to-be in the first place. Currently, no single umbrella term exists for this classification, and the sentiment has to be written out every time as “the study of processes-of-becoming.” Evolution, biological ontogeny, complexity science, morphodynamics, self-organization and their relata all refer to processes-of-becoming under very specific domains of science. While separate domains of philosophy and science may relate to each other, they do not explicitly include each other within their own categories. This inhibits a cross-discipline cladistic study of generative-processes. Universal or scale-invariant patterns are rediscovered separately in each field of study. A more general cladistic or typology encompassing general processes of becoming could work towards multidisciplinary consilience. 

Ontogenology is hence a broad categorical term enabling reference to an entire class of ontically fundamental processes. Adoption of this term is justified as an abbreviation for the longer statement, “the general study of processes of becoming,” and no current term holds the same general meaning. Further, “process ontology” does not suffice as a synonym, because process ontology is a metaphysical stance, whereas ontogenology is an ontical study of processes. Ontogenology is a cladistic of process ontology, an interrelated set of processes-of-becoming. The study of ontogenology opens a vocabulary for taking perspectives on the open issues of being and becoming. 

To recap: Considered under process ontology, a being is more accurately conceived as a becoming. Additionally, ontogeny precedes ontology; the becoming of being precedes the study of being. Further, if the becoming of being (onto-geny) precedes the character of being (ontics), then the study of onto-geny classifies the study of being. Restated, ontogen-ology classifies onto-logy. 

Note that the word usage of precede is meant in a circular and non-dichotomous way. Additionally, each perspective is mutually informative via a different level of abstraction; one perspective is not necessarily privileged over another. The issue of the question of being is open-ended and many perspectives are necessary (but not sufficient) to approach it. As Maurice Merleau Ponty states, “We know not through our intellect but through our experience.”

In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger develops an ontology of being; his aim is to study the issue of being. Dasein is then described as the being for whom its existence becomes an issue for itself, i.e. the being that can care about its ontical nature. Heidegger’s motivation is that the existential “ontology of being” is an issue of importance with implications for any further questions of philosophy and science (Heidegger, 2010). 

For Heidegger’s ontology, as for process ontology, being is a matter of coming-into-being. The study of being (ontology), specifically the study of coming-into-being (ontogen-ology), is philosophically precedent to the ontical characteristics of beings (as describable by philosophy and science). Becoming precedes being in a processually-circular, mutually informing and non-dichotomous way. However, a specific typology for “processes of becoming” is left unexamined in Being and Time. Thus, the project of ontogenology is to describe various morphodynamic topologies of ontology itself. In this way, ontogenology provides a cladistic description of ontology; the clades together comprise a typology of ontically-precedent generative processes. 

Process Ontology 

The philosophers John Dupré and Daniel J. Nicholson argue for a metaphysical stance of process ontology. In short, ontical “things” are best understood as diachronic and flowing processes, not as stable substances with essential properties. Apparently stable and objectified “things with properties” are hence abstractions from a holistic processual flow (Dupré & Nicholson, 2018). 

Nicholson relates process ontology to concepts of non equilibrium thermodynamics, self organization, spontaneous order, driven-dissipative systems, and non-equilibrium steady states:

The recognition of non-equilibrium systems led to the development in the mid-twentieth century of what has come to be known as nonequilibrium thermodynamics, which concerns itself with steady states, irreversible processes, and non-linear reactions. The subject matter of this relatively new branch of thermodynamics extends beyond the living realm, as organisms are not the only far-from-equilibrium open systems found in nature. Whirlpools, flames, and tornadoes are familiar examples. Less familiar but well-studied cases include Bénard convection cells and oscillating chemical reactions such as the Belousov–Zhabotinsky reaction. Ilya Prigogine, whose foundational work in establishing non-equilibrium thermodynamics earned him a Nobel Prize in 1977, referred to these open systems as dissipative structures. Perhaps the most significant achievement of this new field of physics has been to show how self-organization arises in nature—that is, to explain how the macroscopic patterns of order displayed by dissipative structures spontaneously emerge from non-linear interactions and become stabilized in far-from equilibrium conditions through an ongoing flux of energy and matter. (Ibid., p. 144).

Under the metaphysical stance of substance ontology, form and function are attributes of ontically stable things. Bounded, determinate things are of various objective kinds and possess essential properties. Stability is precedent and change requires explanation. This perspective can be philosophically problematic. Process ontology inverts the reasoning of substance ontology. Under process ontology, change and flow is considered precedent (e.g. entropy), and appearances of stability and order require explanation. The adoption of process ontology inverts the fundamental metaphysical assumptions underlying the epistemological basis for posing questions. Dupré and Nicholson write:

The transition we are urging from a substance ontology to a process ontology has one very important epistemological implication. In any scientific enquiry it is necessary to distinguish what requires explanation from what is background, taken for granted. The orthodox substantialist position of modern science typically takes this background to involve stability: if nothing changes, then nothing requires explanation. This is because the default mode of existence of a thing is stasis and consequently the need for explanation only arises when changes happen to it. For a process, however, change is the norm, and it is its relative stability that takes priority in the explanatory order. If the living realm is indeed processual, then we should consider the central explanandum of biology to be not change but stability—or, more precisely, stability achieved by activity, that is, by change. (Dupré & Nicholson, 2018, p. 14).

Ordered systems are reconceptualized as impositions of pattern (formal cause) upon material and energetic flow (flowing material cause) under continuous material-energetic turnover. Against entropy, these open systems require an influx of free energy to do the useful work involved in maintaining metastable states. Governing and enabling constraints channel free energy into a few degrees of freedom to do useful work for the precariously organized pattern’s immanent processes. Ordered negentropic patterns require input of free energy into their open systems to maintain stability of self organization. The stable thing under process ontology is hence a metastable formal cause, imposed upon a flowing material-energetic, spatio-temporal and entropic-negentropic flow. 

Perceptual knowledge considered under substance ontology and process ontology 

Under process ontology, the things of substance ontology are not taken to be ontically real, observer-independent (normatively discrete en soi, apart from the norms enacted by an observer), nor determinant objects with essential properties. Instead, an observer’s active objectifications are taken to be enactments of normativity in coupling with a processual flow, i.e. perception as sense-making. Perceptual knowledge as a form of representation of static things and objects (substance ontology) is replaced with perceptual knowledge as processes of objectification as sense-making (process ontology). Perception deeply involves enacting some qualitative significance with transiently coupled processes, idiosyncratically framed to the norms of a living organism’s form of precarious operational closure. Perception is deeply normative. 

Under substance ontology: perception is via processing objects (to represent the sensed). Under process ontology:

perception is via objectifying process (sense-making).

Under substance ontology: physical properties of observer-independent objects are perceived via information processing or representation. Under process ontology, properties and norms of objects are observer contingent. To paraphrase Uekxüll, the properties of objects are organism-like in the same way that a bee is flower-like and a flower is bee-like. Properties of perceived objects are not observer-independent. Properties are of the beholder. Without an enacted horizonal perspective, a process-in-itself remains unsignified but still potentially signifiable. Under process ontology: the notion of ontically stable, observer-independent substantive objects is replaced with an organism’s pragmatic, perspectival and enactive processes of objectification. 

Even so, observable entities ranging in scale from electrons to organisms appear thinglike as stable, determinate objects with properties. However, the stable appearance of things is not due to an underlying ontological nature of being substances-with-objective properties. Thinglike stability is instead an abstraction from concrete processual flow. Under process ontology, to propose the real existence of stable things-with-properties is a reification. Perceptual knowledge of such metaphysically reified things would require representation under substance ontology, but under process ontology the qualitative norms themselves (defining the stable properties of things) are enacted in vivo by a perceptually-coupling organism (itself an evolving, developing, living process). Norms (as alleged properties of things) are not represented, they are enacted. Norms can only be enacted by an autonomous life form, auto-nomy literally meaning laws (normativity) generated from a self. Significance is enacted by organism-contingent normativity. In other words, the appearance or disclosure of thinglike substances or objects is due to a process of enactive objectification. Objectification is an activity performed while interacting with otherwise unsignified, spatiotemporally flowing processes. Abiotic physical processes are not normatively bounded in-themselves (i.e. if considered when decoupled from the autonomy of a perceptually- and structurally-coupled organism). The thing-in-itself lacks boundaries in-itsef because abiotic physicality lacks any selfhood generated and bounded by autonomy. Thus a thing-in-itsef is strictly a misnomer to characterize physicality apart from life; no demarcating boundaries of self-ishness stand apart from the perspectival horizons of a whole lifeform. Flowing, patterning physical process is potentially signifiable but chronically unsignified until coupled with a suitably attuned organism. Such an attuned organism has historical, material and energetic contingencies with its mileu of chronically unsignified (but potentially signifiable) processual flow. 

The apparent substance-like stability and reliability of objectifications shouldn’t obscure a stance of process metaphysics. Under process ontology, enacted objectifications may give rise to stable, reliable appearances of objects upon reiterated reflection. However, to propose their ontological nature as substance or observer-independent objects-in-themselves is a reification. Under substance ontology, objects and their properties in-themselves do not need to be enacted via objectification, they need to be accurately represented according to their stable, factual natures. For substance ontology, to propose ontically real objects as metaphysically primary requires representation as a way of perceptual knowledge, but this is reification under process ontology. Instead, under process ontology, the reliable appearance of objects results from skilled, practic objectification with a stable niche of physical process, not representation of a world of physical substance. 

Perceptual knowledge is a process of objectification (v), not a representation of objects (n). 

The organism enacts idiosyncratic norms in coupling with its niche of ontical processes. Such norms are sedimented over time with reiterated couplings, i.e. a path-laid-in-walking, a niche construction. The metaphysical stance of things-in-themselves is replaced with a stance of processes-in-themselves (or more strictly speaking, processes-decoupled-from-selves). Process-in-itself is objectified during perceptual disclosure (sense-making under process ontology) whereas objects-in-themselves are represented (under substance ontology).  Normativity for the former is enacted and pragmatic whereas normativity for the latter is due to observer-independent conditions of factual validity. Factual normativity of validity, truth and accuracy relates to the correspondence theory of truth. Under substance ontology, philosophical framing problems and symbol grounding problems remain for a perceptual theory that relies on representationalism against observer-independent norms. In contrast, processual enaction avoids such problems in that life interactively frames and enacts its own normativity and significance via autonomy.

Applied to a philosophy of perception, the word usage of enactive objectification, to sign-ify or to figure-out are meant to be synonymous with the enactive concept of sense-making. Restated, the intended word usage to sign-ify means to enact a significance (contingent to the norms of life), but not to represent a realist sign-signifier relationship (that stands independent of life).

Applied to living systems, the apparent stability of an organism as a thing is likewise an abstraction from its status as a processual becoming, as explained by Nicholson:

As processes, organisms are extended and differentiated not only in space but also in time. It is wrong to speak of an organism and its history as if the two were somehow separable. Strictly speaking, an organism does not have a temporal trajectory; it is itself a temporal trajectory. What we perceive as an organism at any point in time represents only a cross section (or a time slice) in the unfolding of the process it instantiates. And it is this entire four-dimensional process, rather than any of its momentary three-dimensional manifestations, that constitutes the actual living entity. (Nicholson, 2018, p. 157). 

 

Under substance ontology, the objective stability of substances-with-properties is  considered precedent, and change requires explanation. Under process ontology, flow and change are precedent (e.g. entropy) and stability requires explanation (e.g. localized order). Order self-organizes from disorder, and stable patterns imposed on flow can be abstracted. The dimensions, stability and properties of such objectified abstractions are contingent upon the concrete sensorimotor and temporalizing embodiments of the engaged observer, its pragmatic and heuristic relations, and its instrumental normativity. In the absence of observers, the ambiently patterning “observer-independent reality” en soi is potentially signifiable, but remains chronically un-signified. This is for an environment to be potentially determinable or relatable when structurally coupled with a historically attuned organism, but to remain indeterminate and normatively unrelated in-itself. Signification is an organism-contingent process of objectification. Objects-in-themselves cannot be represented against the norms of observer-independent realism because they are not normatively significant in-themselves, lacking any bounds of self, lacking any auto-nomy. 

Under process ontology, things-in-themselves are rather processes-in-themselves (or more accurately, processes apart from selves). Without an objectifying observer to enact normative significance, there are no ontically real objectifications-in-themselves.  Objectifications are as much telling of the attuned organism as they are telling of the patterns of a physical environment. The embodiments of observers are physically and historically attuned with their ambiently patterning physical environments. Attunement means that structurally coupled organism-environment systems coevolve with each other over time; e.g. organisms construct niches and niches reciprocally pressure organisms in a circular process. Together, holistic organism-environment systems coevolve, codevelop, and lay paths in each other through the historizing processes of evolution, development, niche construction and experiential learning.

Process and the Enactive Approach versus Substance and Representationalism

A dialectic between substance ontology and enaction is incompatible: ontical things (nouns) are considered determinate in their being. Things are stable “substances-with-properties.” These substances must be represented to know of them and their real properties, and it is incoherent to say that “substances must be enacted to know them.”

A dialectic between process ontology and enaction has greater compatibility. Representation is replaced with an enactive process of sense-making. To enact a perceptual field is to differentiate figures from ground relative to an organism’s norms, structurally coupled to- and historically coevolving with- an environment. Norms for significance relate to the precarious operational closure of life. 

Restated: the presupposed meaningful properties of things-in-themselves are not representable because things do not have normative properties of meaning in-themselves and in decoupled isolation from the norms of an organism. Further, organisms facultatively interact with patterned processes, they do not factually represent properties of things. The task of representing things-in-themselves is replaced with the task of interacting with processes-in-themselves, and therein enacting a lived normativity. To reiterate: under substance-metaphysics with representationalism, perception is mediated by modeling things-in-themselves against the truth/accuracy conditions of an observer independent reality. Under process-metaphysics and the enactive approach, perception is direct by interacting with processes-in-themselves and self-organizing some normativity. The basis for these claims is laid by Di Paolo et al. 

According to enactivism, the body counts as a cognitive system because it is possible to deduce from processes of precarious, material self-individuation, the concept of sense-making (i.e., a perspective of meaning on the world invested with interest for the agent itself). With the individuation of an autonomous identity there arises (in history, but also at each moment) an intrinsic norm aimed at securing the systemic identity, a basic dimension of care, and thus a subjective viewpoint from which interactions with the world are evaluated and thus become meaningful. (2017, p. 22).

Under substance ontology, real things are represented to obtain knowledge of them, and representational content is made normative against the truth-and-accuracy conditions of reality (as in the correspondence theory of truth). Phenomena are appearances derived from the real observer-independent world, and we gain determinable knowledge of their truth-conditions via objective realism. The real world has to be phenomenally represented, and it is incoherent to speak of “enacting a world.” A substance ontology of ontically real and stable things-with-properties resonates with cognitivism and representationalism, but does not sit well with enaction. 

Representation is the appropriate cognitive action to perform upon the thing-like “objects” of substance ontology, as ontical nouns with adjectives. In contrast, enaction is the appropriate action to perform with the open “objectifications” or “sense-makings” of process ontology, as ontical verbs with adverbs. Therein lies the difference between representing observer-independent objects versus enacting an objectification with observer-contingent norms. To enact objectifications is not to represent objects. Sense-making as a way of knowing with the world is a type of enactive objectification, a pre-reflective know-how. Determinate objects are not represented via conceptual knowledge. Instead, the interactive process of enactive objectification makes-sense with an open endedly-differentiable world, via know-how. Such know-how belongs to the domain of the body schema and motor intentionality (per Maurice Merleau Ponty), sensorimotor contingencies (Alva Noe) or affordances (James Gibson). Di Paolo et al (2017) provide elaboration on these points:

[T]his is not to say that abstract, disengaged conceptual knowledge is required in order to perceive. On the contrary, the claim is that practical, engaged, often non-conceptual, sensorimotor skills underlie all of our perceptual acts. This is the know-how that we display when we move about in our environment using our senses. Together with this know-how the way we actually deal with our world is also a constitutive factor of our perceptual experience. When we speak about understanding, therefore, we mean it in the practical sense of the term. (p. 78, emphasis added).

Under substance ontology, cognitivism and representation yield a way of knowing of the world as a type of objective realism. Truth is relative to the correspondence theory of truth, and falsity leads to illusions. Under process ontology and the enactive approach, perception is an activity of sense-making, not the representation of observer-independent truths. Significance and normativity relate to the autonomy of a precarious organism-environment system and its various inter penetrating eco-evo-devo and experientially-learned histories of structural couplings and attunements. Truth-and-falsity is replaced with mastery of one’s sensorimotor life, dispositions, performance, norms and valuations from an organism-contingent locus. When considered under process ontology, the propositional move of objective realism turns epistemically pragmatic abstractions into asserted reifications. 

Autonomous systems do not operate on the basis of internal representations in the subjectivist/objectivist sense. Instead of internally representing an external world in some Cartesian sense, they enact an environment inseparable from their own structure and actions. (Thompson, 2010, p. 67).

This passage by Evan Thompson develops the aforementioned concept of enactive objectification or sense-making. A process of enactive objectification replaces the representation of substantial objects-with-properties. Significance of objectification (v.) is co-relational to a precarious operational closure’s vital norms and history. In contrast, the meaning-content of represented objects (n.) is made relative to correspondence with the truth-conditions of objective reality (as in the correspondence theory of truth). 

Reification and the related fallacy-of-misplaced-concreteness occur when an abstraction is treated propositionally as a real concrete entity or when a model is treated as reality. Under process ontology, this would be to claim that perception involves contentful representationalism of substantial objects-with-properties and truth conditions. 

The fallacy of reification indirectly relates to binary bias or black-and-white thinking. Abstracted binary digitalisms are treated as real dichotomies, whereas their subject matter is neither one-nor-two. Concrete wholes are open ended and may offer many perspectives, enabling abstractions into spectrums with dimensions and degrees beyond the choice of two. Ambiguity, continuity and correlational indeterminism are characteristics of processual wholes under process ontology. Dichotomy, digitalism, and determinism are hence treated as artefacts of heuristic abstractions. However, to assert ontical digitalisms of real objects (having determinate boundaries and essential properties) is a fallacy of reification. Therefore, substance ontology enables reification of observer-independent boundaries upon the open-ended and indeterminate.

If a noumenon exists with no one around to interact with, does it have ontical boundaries? Are its boundaries spatiotemporally determinate? If so, then on what scales, with what qualities and quantities, and how are these norms determined objectively without a coupled observer? What does a tree falling in a forest sound like if no organism with ears can relationally discriminate and signify the patterning waves of air?

Within the stance of process ontology and the enactive approach: objects are not ontically bounded in-themselves apart from a structurally-coupled organism that can normatively enact some objectification of significant bounds. Further, the decoupled environment en soi is not a field of objects (to be represented), but a field of ambiently patterning processes (that may potentially be coupled-with, objectified and normatively signified). Moreover, these patterns are not strictly patterned (as in static) but patterning in a continuous state of becoming. This stance does not reject realism, but does specifically reject objective realism. The replacement for a substance-based objective realism is a processual and perspectival realism that can be pragmatically known via enacting significance. Norms of signification and objectification are relative to the precarious processual-forms of living organizations and their idiosyncratic ways of structurally-coupling with ambiently patterning processes. Objective realism is rejected because objects do not have ontical boundaries in themselves relative to veridical normativity.  Such boundaries must be enacted by living organisms and their various normative ways of interacting with processes. Perspectival realism via enacted objectifications (sense-making) with processual reality replaces objective realism as veridical representation of objective reality. 

Avoiding Problems

Under substance ontology, representationalism faces an intractable “hard problem of content” and “symbol grounding problem” (Hutto & Myin, 2017). In short, the “meaning” carried by symbols and contentful representations is inevitably deferred to some other difference in syntactic structure, or some difference in empirical findings. However, the buck never stops passing: symbols cannot ground their own meaning, and content can never find its anchor in knowledge of real, observer-independent things-in-themselves. This intractability is expressed by Derrida’s notion of “différance.” Meaning is inevitably deferred to some other contingency of difference, at least when considered under the frameworks of substance ontology and cognitivism. These problems alone provide motivation to explore process ontology and enaction. The hard problem of content and the symbol grounding problems act as reductio ad absurdums against substance ontology and representationalism. Processual enaction does not seek to ground semantics of representational symbols against the veridicality-norms of an observer independent world. Organisms enact their own lived normativity and significance via autonomy, autopoiesis and the precarious structural coupling of an organism-environment system. 

In closing, many philosophical problems are artefactual from having grounds in substance ontology, including essentialism, mechanicism, reductionism, dualism, teleology, the hard problem of consciousness, qualia, the symbol grounding problem and the related hard problem of content. These problems can be avoided or remedied under a philosophical framework of the enactive approach under a metaphysical stance of process ontology.

If grounded in process ontology, the enactive approach avoids the intractable symbol grounding problem, hard problem of content, and framing problem. The framework of processual enaction does not ground meaning against veridical normativity, i.e. to accurately represent the observer-independent world of objective realism (as in the correspondence theory of truth). Instead, the enactive approach grounds significance with vital normativity contingent on life's precarious autonomy, pragmatics, histories and skills. The enactive approach under process ontology allows for an epistemic plurality along the lines of perspectival realism (Giere, 2006; Wimsatt, 2007), standpoint epistemology and pragmatic philosophy of science, without implying enaction of a world ex nihilo.